

GREEK AMERICAN RELATIONS IN TRANSITION

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Greek American relations, which for so long have been considered a model of closeness, are currently at an impasse. They may even be gradually approaching the boundaries of crisis. The reasons for this dramatic turnabout are immediate as well as deep-seated.

The latest straw that appears to be straining the back of Greek American relations stems from the frustrations surrounding the Greek government's attempts to reintegrate Greece into the military arm of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The story goes something like this: Greece in August 1974 decided to withdraw from the integrated military structure of the North Atlantic alliance. This step was taken with great reluctance and in the face of what appeared to be NATO's inability or unwillingness to respond to Turkey's invasion and occupation of northern Cyprus. At that time Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis declared that Greece would not return to the alliance until the reasons which had forced the country to withdraw ceased to exist.

In the years which followed, and following consistent proddings on the part of the USA, the Greek government (then under Constantine Karamanlis) gradually reassessed matters and began formulating a new set of proposals designed to reintegrate Greece into NATO's military structure. In a spirit of accommodation, no attempt was made to link these reentry proposals to Turkey's military withdrawal from Cyprus. Following a series of exploratory meetings, which took place between March 15 and May 24, 1978, the then chief of staff of the Greek armed forces (General Ioannis Davos) and the then military commander of NATO (General Alexander Haig) hammered out an agreement providing for an updated status of Greek participation in NATO. The agreement

called for a new and special relationship which would permit the bulk of Greece's armed forces to remain under national operational control in time of peace; however, these forces would revert to NATO-wide control in case of strategic crisis. Further, at Greece's suggestion, the agreement called for a return to the regional command and control structure which obtained in 1974 at the time of Greece's withdrawal. Karamanlis' decision to formally seek NATO reintegration for Greece was not an act free of political cost at home. Nearly the whole spectrum of opposition parties, with the exception of a marginal right wing faction, disapproves of Greece's unqualified reentry into NATO without the conditions that led to its withdrawal somehow being corrected.

The Davos-Haig agreement was promptly referred to NATO's military committee where it gained the approval of all members except Turkey. Turkey refused to lift its objections until Greece agreed to provisions that would divide air control responsibility over the Aegean Sea region. As a minimum, Turkey was prepared to accept a regime of joint control over certain portions of the Aegean air space. In response to some of Turkey's objections and in quest of a mutually acceptable compromise package, General Haig designed a second set of proposals. These proposals were intended to bypass the thorny issue of Greek versus Turkish control in the Aegean by suggesting internationalized operational control for the disputed region. Haig's new proposals were submitted to the Greek side on May 29, 1979 and were deemed unacceptable because they would be extending Turkey's security zone over Greece's Eastern Aegean islands and the Dodecanese. Since then the process appears to have bogged down and little progress has been made in subsequent meetings involving General Haig's successor, General Bernard Rogers.

Policymakers in Athens have greeted the latest twist of events with a mixture of incredulity, frustration, and indignation. Prime Minister George Rallis reportedly exclaimed to one of his confidants while he was serving as Foreign Minister that he was being awaked lately by nightmares over what the Americans would do next. Greek policymakers are said to have rejected the spirit of General Haig's counter-proposals arguing that Greece's reentry into NATO could not be negotiated at the expense of undermining Greece's sovereignty and territorial integrity in the Aegean.

In fact, matters have gone a bit further. According to a number of informed sources, both Karamanlis and Rallis have been underscoring their frustration over the reintegration issue in conversations with American diplomats. Both leaders are asking a simple but important question: What will be the purpose of the continued presence of U.S. bases on Greek soil (whether in Crete or the mainland) if Greece is not to be allowed to reenter NATO? After all, these bases were established as far back as 1953 to "provide for the security and defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Area"¹ as called for in Article 3 of the treaty. Thus, using gentle yet firm language, the conservative Greek government has begun a process of linkage between NATO reentry and the status of American bases in Greece.

II

The next few months may prove of critical importance for Greek American relations. With elections forecast for the near future² the alternatives available to the Rallis government in handling the issue of U.S. bases and NATO will progressively narrow.

Deep disillusionment with the United States in Greece today can be traced in both conscious and subconscious reactions of the Greek public. In a country whose contemporary history (since 1830) has been marked by foreign interference

and manipulation, subconscious reaction against the post World War II patron-client relationship between the U.S. and Greece cannot be lightly dismissed. On the side of consciousness, Greek popular chagrin with the United States is based on four widely held perceptions:^{2a}

- 1) The U.S. has supported right wing forces (often using undisguised interference) in the Greek political spectrum since the late 1940s;
- 2) The U.S. has played the British and later the Turkish cards rather than the Greek ones on the thorny Cyprus question;
- 3) The U.S. uncritically accepted and propped up the Colonels' oppressive regime (1967-74);
- 4) The U.S. has supported (and continues to tilt in favor of) an expansionist and revisionist Turkey in the Cyprus and Aegean settings.

Given the approaching pre-election fever and assuming that Turkey fails to lift its objections to Greece's unconditional NATO reentry, George Rallis will have to choose among a relatively narrow range of options on the NATO/American bases issue. The first and somewhat unlikely option is to do nothing about clarifying the presence of the U.S. bases in Greece even though reentry into NATO continues to be blocked. The projected domestic consequence of this choice would likely prove politically costly for the party in power. Rallis moderate-right political party, the New Democracy, would be roundly criticized by the opposition, which is currently spearheaded by the charismatic and left-leaning figure of Andreas Papandreou. This American educated economist heads the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) that secured 25 percent of the popular vote and about one third of the parliamentary seats in the elections of November 1977. PASOK and the remaining opposition parties (which cover the center and left of the political spectrum) would criticize the government for ineffectual bluffing and then caving into orchestrated American-Turkish pre-

ssures. Given that the New Democracy party's share of the popular vote fell from nearly 55 percent in the elections of 1974 to about 42 percent in 1977, this option does not appear to have much chance of adoption.

A second option that has been discussed in the Greek press - but one not necessarily attractive to the New Democracy party - is the so-called "Spanish Scenario". The Greek Government, that is, retreats from its request to reenter NATO under a special relationship and concluded^S instead a four year bilateral agreement with the United States to provide for the functioning of U.S. operated facilities in Greece. The advantage of this option is that Greece continues to maintain a balance vis-a-vis Turkey with respect to relations with the U.S. The disadvantage ~~of this option~~ is that the New Democracy party will appear as having been rebuffed by the NATO alliance following its attempts to achieve reintegration of the past three years, and this option, also, is likely to be somewhat painful for New Democracy at the ballot box.

The third available option is to conditionally or partially suspend U.S. base operations in Greece pending resolution of the NATO reentry question. In this instance too, the New Democracy party is likely to face some--but considerably more muted--criticism. Opposition parties would probably view base suspension provisions as half measures designed primarily to obscure "the government's weakness and loss of nerve" vis-a-vis the Americans. Yet given the reversibility of this approach and the flexibility (if not prudence) that it entails, the chances of electoral damage would be slim. Therefore, it appears a quite likely candidate for selection.

The fourth and less reversible option is to close down U.S. bases and invite all U.S. forces to leave the Greek soil. This would be likely to evoke a feeling of solidarity among the opposition parties (with the exception of the extreme right). Greek political parties and factions would close ranks in expectation of adverse American responses to such a momentous turn of events.

In the siege mentality that would develop the New Democracy would stand to gain in the eyes of the electorate. However, because of the general orientation of the New Democracy party's foreign policy (a style of prudence, incrementalism, and nonconfrontation), chances are relatively limited that this tricky road would be followed, at least in the short run. Nevertheless, it is important to understand that the third option--conditionally or partially suspending U.S. base operations --could also ultimately lead to the closure of American bases.

The whole sequence of scenarios presented above can be avoided if Turkey decides to lift its objections to Greece's NATO reentry application. But a turnabout in attitude, given the Turkish leadership's current assessments regarding its national interests, is quite unlikely -- unless the U.S. and other NATO states decide to apply various types of pressure upon a country that is already facing a multiplicity of political and economic problems.³ Such pressures, however, will certainly reinforce feelings in Turkey that the U.S. and NATO are now tilting in favor of Greece. Turkey, therefore, may start flirting once again with options similar to number three and four above. We shall return to what appears to be a difficult, if not classic, dilemma for the United States and NATO in the final part of this essay.

III

As suggested, the strains in Greek American relations can be traced to deep-seated as well as immediate causes. The main deep-seated cause is a strong public reaction in Greece against the patron-client relationship that existed with the U.S. between 1947 and 1974. In such a relationship the junior ally views itself as being taken for granted by the senior one. When the Truman Doctrine was first proclaimed in 1947, Greece was nearly in shambles. Dean Acheson described the Greek state then as "a semi-conscious patient on the

critical list whose relatives and physicians had been discussing whether his life could be saved." Similarly, George Papandreou, summarizing the feelings of Greek non-communist elites, once remarked that Greece " ... was breathing with one English and one American lung." Exhausted by a tragic decade of war, occupation, internal suspicion, and fratricidal conflict, Greece was so dependent on the U.S. for military, economic, and political support that it could have been (and indeed was) taken for granted.

The governments that ran Greece in the early post war period adopted an anti-communist orientation internally and pro-NATO and pro-United States orientation externally. In the 1950s there were no major differences among the functioning political parties on questions of foreign policy (the Greek communists had not been permitted to function legally from 1947 to 1974). The non-communist political parties of the center and right started from the same premise--that Greece had no option but to align itself with the major sea power that controlled the Mediterranean. Hence, an alliance with Britain and later with the United States, was not only deemed advantageous but also unavoidable. For Greek political strategists of the early 1950s life was, therefore, relatively uncomplicated. The foe was world communism, and the threat came from the north --primarily through Bulgaria which was closely aligned with the Soviet Union. NATO solidarity was perceived as Greece's only defense.

This clear-cut picture became clouded in the middle of the 1950s with the outbreak of the Cyprus conflict. The political parties--especially those of the opposition--began to point out that Greek association with NATO called for national sacrifices because the United States was tilting in favor of more "important" NATO allies, such as Britain and later Turkey. Moreover, according to the opposition (especially the left), Greece, through NATO

association, was burdened with a disproportionate share of defense-related costs. These parties therefore favored policies leading to detente, de-nuclearization, and even demilitarization in the Balkans. If successful, it was argued, these plans would have relieved Greek governments of heavy defense expenditures and would have allowed the diversion of funds toward economic and social development programs.

The Zurich and London agreements negotiated between Britain, Greece, and Turkey in 1959-60 led to a temporary resolution of the Cyprus dispute. Cyprus emerged as an independent state--a product of political compromise reflecting the balance of power within NATO. The Cyprus constitution, accordingly, gave the Turkish minority community on the island disproportionate political power by permitting its leaders to exercise a veto on important domestic and foreign policy legislation. The arrangement was resented by the Greek Cypriot majority, and attempts were made to revise the Cypriot constitution in 1963. This, in turn, precipitated the second major Cyprus crisis--one that has continued to the present time.

Greek American relations were strained further in the 1960s. The economic and political development that was taking root in Greece and the climate of international detente resulted in reduced perceptions of a threat from the communist north. The smoldering Cyprus dispute only added to the frustration that had been rising as a result of long years of American interference in Greek affairs. A serious movement sprang up that advocated Greek independence, an end to American interference, and the adoption of foreign policies that would no longer subordinate Greek national interests in Cyprus to NATO (i.e., American) interests. The most articulate proponent of this mood was Andreas Papandreou, who in the mid-1960s was a leading member of the Center Union Party which was headed by his father George Papandreou.

The imposition of a seven-year, right wing military dictatorship in Greece in 1967 temporarily contained the overt deterioration in Greek American relations. The dictatorship pursued predictably anti-communist and pro-NATO foreign policies. Throughout the junta period (1967-74), United States foreign policy was supportive, by and large, of the military government. Thus, in the minds of the vast majority of Greeks, the U.S. was identified with a hateful authoritarian regime that mismanaged the country and oppressed the people. This regime eventually perpetrated a mindless coup against the late President Makarios of Cyprus (July 1974), thus furnishing Turkey with a perfect opportunity to invade and occupy northern Cyprus under a mantle of legality.

The seven-year dictatorship--despite its right wing orientation--tried to discredit all Greek politicians, whether of the left or of the right. The result was that Greek political forces emerged from their seven-year ordeal with a relative sense of unity. The essence of this new unity can be summarized as follows. With regard to external issues, all parties agreed that Greece should attain the maximum feasible degree of independence from super-power tutelage. With regard to internal issues, there was a recognition that sustaining democratic structures and processes over time served not only a specific party interest but also a collective interest.

The transition from dictatorship to democracy was accomplished with a minimum of disorder and violence. According to the perception of most Greeks, Turkey posed the greatest and most immediate threat to Greece's territorial integrity. This uniform perception helped keep both public and elite demands in check. And at the same time it refocused the attention of the Greek military on its duties of external defense rather than internal involvement in the political process.

The disillusionment caused by seven years of authoritarian rule also contributed to the healing of the two central problems that had plagued Greece throughout the twentieth century. With the plebiscite of December 1974 the Greeks settled the volatile issue of the monarchy by opting nearly three to one for a presidential parliamentary republic. Further, with the elections of November 1974 an important segment of the Greek political world was reintegrated into the parliamentary process. The Greek Communist Party (after practically forty years of underground existence) was legalized and permitted to seek the vote of the Greek public. Thus, the year 1974 can be considered a milestone of the twentieth century--marking the end of the schisms of royalism versus anti-royalism and communism versus anti-communism.

Since the restoration of democracy in 1974, important differences (especially in the area of foreign policy) have been separating the views of Karamanlis' and Rallis' New Democracy party from those of Papandreou's PASOK and the Greek Communist Party. Essentially, New Democracy proclaims Greece to be a part of the Western political, military, and economic community. PASOK and the Communist^s feel, on the contrary, that Greece would be best served among the movement of nonaligned states. Gradually but steadily, however, a foreign policy consensus may be in the process of unfolding in Greece -- a country that has known few periods of consensus since 1915. This is especially true after the Greek government's "firm stand" on the issue of NATO reentry and Karamanlis' recent visits to the USSR, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia.

Interestingly enough, the seeds of multipartisan consensus between left and right of center forces are being sown on the fertile field of Greece's West European accession policy. For the center-right forces, West European accession represents an opportunity to integrate with "the nine" politically and economically while strengthening Greece's fragile democratic institutions. For the center-left forces, accession (or less formal association) represents

a challenge and an opportunity to promote progressive causes in the relatively open-ended European setting (i.e., to seek economic and social reform domestically and detente internationally.)

Given that accession into the European Communities (EC) appears to be assured,⁴ the general foreign policy orientation of Greek governments in the years to come will probably unfold as follows. Greece will be considered part of West Europe of "the ten," but it will be expected to play a special role as a bridge to the Middle East. Greece, "the balcony of Western Europe" as Karamanlis once graphically described it, will also continue practicing detente and seeking to institutionalize peace with other Balkan states, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union.

Within this general West European orientation, there will be a choice between two models, depending on the outcome of the question of Greek reintegration into NATO. If reentry into the military arm of NATO on terms acceptable to Greece is accomplished in the foreseeable future, then Greece's role in the Western European community will be similar to that of Britain and West Germany. This means that NATO bases and forces will be permitted to remain on Greek territory despite continued, albeit progressively muted, opposition criticism of this stance. If, on the other hand, reentry into the military arm of NATO is not accomplished, then Greece's role will more likely gravitate toward the French model. This would call for the gradual removal of NATO bases and forces from the Greek territorial nexus. And this contingency is likely, as we suggested earlier, to evoke considerably stronger bipartisan support while simultaneously facilitating the auxiliary role of Greece as a European bridge to the Middle East.

V

At this juncture a serious dilemma is facing American foreign policy-makers regarding the handling of relations with the troubled Greek-Turkish-

Cypriot triangle. The dilemma can be simply stated as follows: What does the United States do when two important allies, whose strategic value to the West is interdependent, appear to be locked into a conflict that is very difficult to reconcile? Indeed, this appears to be a no-win situation. If the United States does nothing, it will be accused of callousness and indifference toward intra-alliance problems. Conversely, for the U.S. to assume an activist stance in the conflict will risk arousing the displeasure of one or both parties--each perceiving the U.S. as "tilting" in favor of the other side or just interfering in their internal affairs.

Although there is no use crying over spilled milk, we must state here that America's painful dilemma in the southeastern sector of NATO could possibly have been averted in the summer of 1974. However, in the fateful days of mid-July 1974, the Nixon administration was foundering in the rough waves of Watergate and Henry Kissinger's last minute attempts to contain the Greek-Turkish conflict fell far short of the mark.

In the view of some critics, Henry Kissinger opted for a U.S. stance of passivity (if not orchestrated impotence) in the critical days of July-August 1974. The situation could have been kept under control had Kissinger authorized an activist American role in the Greek-Turkish fracas over Cyprus. Instead, he chose not to strong-arm the Greek colonels into abandoning their ill-advised coup that targeted President Makarios. The colonels' act triggered, in turn, the subsequent waves of Turkish military intervention in Cyprus. Here again, Kissinger's foreign policy stance was quite passive. The net effect was that Greece and Turkey were allowed to place themselves squarely onto a collision course.⁵

The protracted Greek-Turkish conflict, which was uncorked in 1974, is the reality with which we must deal today. In addition to long suffering Cyprus, there is a series of sharply contested disputes dividing Greece and

Turkey over the disposition and demarcation of the continental shelf and territorial air in the Aegean region. U.S. policies toward the troubled southeastern flank since July 1974 have led paradoxically to double-barreled trouble. As a result of the pluralistic nature of America's foreign policymaking process and the post Watergate Congressional reassertiveness toward the Executive in foreign policy matters, America's policies toward Greece and Turkey have managed so far to elicit strong negative reactions in both countries.

The Turks, for example, have reacted in anger to the Congressional imposition of a partial embargo on U.S. military aid and sales to Turkey (1975-78)-- the lifting of which was made conditional on progress toward a just settlement of the Cyprus issue. Arguing that Congress was dancing to the tune of a "powerful" ethnic lobby (the Greek lobby), Turkey proceeded in retaliation to partially suspend the operations of some important U.S. bases and listening posts, linking their reactivation to the unconditional lifting of the embargo. The embargo was eventually lifted in September 1978 after a very close vote and the lifting was sold to many legislators as "positive reinforcement" leading to a more conciliatory stance for Turkey toward Cyprus.

The Nixon and Ford administrations, and later the Carter administration, reacted to the Congressional pro-embargo policies by fighting tooth and nail to reverse them in Congress. This, in turn, generated perceptions in Greece and Cyprus that U.S. administrations were clearly tilting in favor of a revisionist and alliance-disrupting Turkey. Among Americans of Greek descent the reaction was even stronger. Perceiving Ford and Kissinger, and Later Carter⁶ and Brzezinski, as solidly in the pro-Turkish camp, Greek-Americans were seething with anger and frustration. Typical of this attitude was the judgement of a prominent American of Greek descent to the effect that "the Turks need no lobby in the United States because they already have the Pentagon and the National Security Council on their side."

The question facing us today is whether or not there is something new that U.S. policymakers can do with regard to the Greek-Turkish issue other than continuing with patchwork policies designed to manage misfortune. There are admittedly no easy formulas out of today's predicament, but one can advance some thoughts for possible consideration.

It is readily apparent that from 1974 to 1979 the U.S. approach to handling relations with Greece and Turkey has backfired in both countries. The Turks, to put it simply, perceive an anti-Turkish Congress and the Greeks an anti-Greek Administration. Thus, both countries have been indulging in a multi-tiered competition--matching their complaints and pressures against the United States with a competitive solicitation of harmonious relations in the Balkans, Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and, of course, the oil rich Arab world.

In this impasse, an obvious but difficult to administer prescription is for the U.S. to adopt an even handed foreign policy toward the troubled triangle. Such a policy would have to be founded on a Congressional-Executive partnership in its conceptualization and its formulation, but it would also call for Executive implementation unhampered by Congressional interference. This policy should be premised on genuine balance toward the Greek-Turkish cluster of disputes. America's even handedness should be military, political, and economic--in one world psychological. Given the interdependency of the Greek and Turkish strategic space, a tilt or choice in favor of one country would entail the alienation of the other. An unequivocal tilt in favor of Greece would probably lead to unacceptable costs for Western security interests in Turkey. Similarly, a clear choice in favor of Turkey would, as we discussed above, tempt Greece to opt out of the NATO security chain and thus split open "the soft underbelly" of Europe. If, as retired Admiral Zumwalt once suggested, the intermediate link (Greece) drops out of the Western security chain, the consequences for the outermost link (Turkey) would be obvious.

Assuming a new policy partnership could be forged between the U.S. Congress and the Executive, what would be its specifics? Here one must carefully examine the nature of the disputes separating Greece and Turkey. Greece, since 1974, has been holding on to a status quo ante position in both the Cyprus and the Aegean disputes. Turkey definitely has adopted a revisionist stance. In order for the U.S. to calibrate a position of balance (even handedness) in the spirit of safeguarding Western defense institutions, it must actively promote the principle that Greek-Turkish disputes be solved through peaceful processes. This could begin with bilateral negotiations between the parties to each dispute and eventually move on to third party conciliation or arbitration methods. Greece and Cyprus have proclaimed their willingness to go along with the peaceful resolution process outlined above. However, Turkey is holding out against institutionalized methods of third party conflict resolution and insisting on direct bilateral negotiations between the parties to each dispute (i.e., Greece and Turkey on the Aegean issues and the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots on Cyprus).

While the disputes continue festering, Greece and Turkey remain positioned on a collision course which hopefully will remain below the threshold of all-out warfare. In what appears to be a Greek-Turkish mini Cold War, the maintenance of fragile peace between the two countries has become a function of balanced power (military, economic, political, psychological). As a result, strategic priorities for each country have shifted considerably, and it has become nearly impossible for them to focus on the East-West confrontation while they both perceive the major threat to be emanating from within the NATO alliance. Beginning with the assumption that Greece and Turkey are today in a position of essential power equivalence, a policy of U.S. balance must strive not to disturb the existing equilibrium by disproportionate support in favor of one country or the other. A formula of balanced support (especially in the military and technical sectors), therefore, would not destabilize the Greek-Turkish balance and could be defended as genuinely even handed.

The argument of course will be heard that since Turkey is a more populous country with more severe economic problems than Greece, it ought to secure a larger slice of the aid pie. In normal times few would take issue with this assertion. But Greek-Turkish relations today are not "normal" by any stretch of the imagination, and unfortunately, peace between them can only be secured through the maintenance of power equivalency.

A policy such as the one outlined above would probably not satisfy completely the various interested parties. The Greek-American community, for example, would prefer to see an American policy of sanctions (e.g., the embargo) applied to Turkey until it retreats from its expansionist stance on Cyprus and the Aegean issues. The Turks would complain that under this set of guidelines Greece would be receiving an equal dose of aid (at whatever level of support) with Turkey. Congress would complain that peace was once more being bought with American dollars (although a policy of balance could still remain operative at zero giving levels for both Greece and Turkey). The Executive would complain at being asked to formulate policies with Congressional ⁴inputs (and Congressional appetites to interfere with policy implementation might still continue). The alternative, however, is to stay with the current bifurcation of Congressional versus Executive policies that have brought us all to a dead end on the Greek-Turkish issues.

NOTES

¹See preamble of "Agreement Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Greece Concerning Military Facilities" (February 4, 1953), Treaties and Other International Acts, Series 1964, 63 Stat., Pt. 2, p. 2241.

²Constitutionally the latest date that elections may be held in Greece is November 1981. However, many observers expect elections to take place soon after the ratification process is completed by the nine European parliaments formalizing Greece's accession to the European Communities. This, in turn, places elections sometime between the spring of 1981 and the Fall of 1981.

^{2a}It is not the purpose of this essay to go into the question of whether these perceptions are justified or not. The fact is that these perceptions are widely held by the Greek public.

³Dankwart Rustow, "Turkey's Travails," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 1, Fall 1979.

⁴The Treaty of Accession between Greece and the EC was signed on May 28, 1979. After a four-day debate the treaty was ratified by the Greek parliament on June 28. The treaty has already secured the approval of the parliaments of the current EC members. Greece is expected to formally enter the Community on January 1, 1981.

⁵For a detailed critical treatment of Henry Kissinger's handling of the 1974 Cyprus crisis see Laurence Stern, The Wrong Horse: The Politics of Intervention and the Failure of American Diplomacy (New York: New York Times Books, 1977).

⁶President Jimmy Carter is unlikely to be "forgiven" by the Greek-American community for having gone back on his pre-election promises regarding the issue of the Turkish embargo.